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The importance of holding corporate leadership responsible for 
their actions has, at least for the moment, assumed a place of 
prominence in American popular consciousness.  However, despite the 
swarms of investigators buzzing around many cultural icons and 
multinational corporations in search of wrongdoing, an ugly truth 
remains: in Minnesota as in many other states, boards of directors are 
protected from shareholder litigation by a plethora of substantive and 
procedural obstacles.  In the face of these barriers, shareholders are 
often powerless to rectify the negligent or even intentional wrongdoing of 
management.  One of the most troublesome of these barriers is the 
“special litigation committee,” purportedly objective persons typically 
charged by a board of directors to decide whether shareholder 
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grievances with the board are valid. 
This May, the Minnesota Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of 
special litigation committees for the first time in Janssen v. Best & 
Flanagan.1  The Janssen decision provides some confusing but tantalizing 
hints that the Minnesota courts may be ready to increase their scrutiny of 
internal corporate governance.  This article describes the history, 
substance, and holding of Janssen and explores what it might mean for 
the business judgment rule in Minnesota.  The article concludes by 
arguing that the Minnesota courts should abandon the deferential 
approach they have traditionally taken to special litigation committee 
decisions and that the Janssen decision empowers the lower courts to 
take the lead in doing so. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically the only method for a shareholder to take action against 
a director for wrongs to a corporation was through a shareholder 
derivative action.2  While derivative actions should, in theory, promote 
director accountability, commentators have questioned whether they 
offer any real benefit to shareholders or any real check on the power of 
directors.3  In an attempt to address these concerns, Minnesota has, like 
most other jurisdictions, imposed several procedural barriers to bringing 
a derivative claim.  The first such obstacle is rule 23.06 of the Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23.06”), which requires any shareholder 
or member seeking to initiate derivative litigation to first demand that the 
corporation’s board of directors initiate the litigation.4  Failure to comply 
with this rule prior to filing a derivative claim is grounds for dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).5  Such a demand is excused only if a plaintiff 
 
 1. 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003). 
 2. A derivative suit is a procedural mechanism by which a shareholder, in the case 
of a business corporation, or a member, in the case of a nonprofit corporation, may 
initiate litigation in the name of the corporation in order to enforce the corporation’s 
rights. See id. at 881 (citing Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ill. 1988) (stating 
that “[t]he derivative suit is a device to protect shareholders against abuses by the 
corporation, its officers and directors, and is a vehicle to ensure corporate 
accountability”)). 
 3. See, e.g., Roslyn Falk, May a Shareholder Who Objects to a Proposed 
Settlement of a Derivative Action Appeal an Adverse Decision? A Report on California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Felzen, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 235, 240-41 (2000) 
(asserting that derivative suits do not substantially deter misconduct and serve only to 
generate excessive attorneys’ fees). 
 4. MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06. 
 5. Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 1999) (holding that 
2
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properly alleges that the board is so biased as to render a demand futile.6 
The second obstacle is more difficult to overcome.  If a board of 
directors declines to join in a proposed derivative suit, Minnesota courts 
will defer to that decision and dismiss the derivative suit absent evidence 
or allegations that the board members acted in bad faith or were 
incapable of making the decision impartially.7  This deference is an 
application of the “business judgment rule,”8 which generally requires 
courts to accept the decisions of corporate management on matters of 
company business, including whether or not to pursue litigation.9  Even 
where a board is alleged to harbor bias with respect to a given decision,10 
the business judgment rule allows the board to overcome that allegation 
of bias by delegating that decision to a “special litigation committee.”11  
Typically such committees consist of directors or other persons who 
were not involved in the subject matter of the litigation and have no 
personal interest in it.12  This committee is given full authority by the 
board to investigate the claims articulated in the derivative suit and to 
decide whether the corporation should step in and assert those claims 
 
compliance with MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06 is an indispensable prerequisite to bringing a 
derivative action). 
 6. Id. 
 7. St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assoc. of N. Am., Inc., 589 N.W. 2d 
511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).  An allegation of bias, which is pled prior to such board 
action, is sufficient to bar the board from making such a decision. See, e.g., Black v. 
NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).  However, once the board has 
considered the action, only actual evidence of bad faith will obviate the deference 
accorded under the business judgment rule. St James, 589 N.W.2d at 515. 
 8. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003) (“The business 
judgment rule means that as long as the disinterested director(s) made an informed 
business decision, in good faith, without an abuse of discretion, he or she will not be 
liable for corporate losses resulting from his or her decision.”) (citation omitted). 
 9. See, e.g., Black, 426 N.W.2d at 210 (explaining that business decisions should 
be left to company management, who are presumed to act in the corporation’s best 
interests). 
 10. A typical example of such a situation would be when a board must decide 
whether or not to join in proposed derivative litigation against one or more of its own 
members. Id. 
 11. Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Skoglund 
v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 12. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (stating that the board decisions were made in “bad faith,” 
particularly where “the directors, themselves, are subject to personal liability” in the 
proposed action, which raises the most serious questions about whether the board is 
entitled to protection under the business judgment rule and that special litigation 
committees can address these potential concerns by appointing “disinterested” persons to 
make a decision for the board). 
3
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itself.13  Minnesota courts have traditionally reviewed the decision of 
such committees only to determine whether it was made independent of 
board influence and in good faith.14 
The practical effect of the business judgment rule when combined 
with the demand requirement of Rule 23.06 is to prohibit shareholders or 
members of a corporation from bringing a derivative lawsuit against the 
wishes of the board unless: (1) the board is alleged to be incapable of 
making an impartial decision, and (2) the board lacks the good sense to 
appoint an independent committee to make the decision for it.15  Some 
commentators have claimed that the system prevents the derivative suit 
from functioning effectively.16  These criticisms appear to be borne out 
by empirical studies, which suggest that nearly all committees 
recommend that the corporation not join in the derivative action.17  
Additionally, special litigation committees are typically composed of 
attorneys and corporate directors, who may be particularly subject to the 
 
 13. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 (stating that it is the task of the special 
litigation committee to “dispassionately review the derivative lawsuit” and decide 
whether it should be pursued). 
 14. Id.  Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the potential for abuse that 
exists in this system and have allowed for a more extensive review of special litigation 
committee decisions. See also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 
1981) (holding that a court should defer to committee only if committee is independent 
and its decision comports with the court’s own business judgment); Biondi v. Scrushy, 
820 A.2d 1148, 1164 n.40 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discussing the problem of structural bias in 
the context of special litigation committees); see also Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59 
(Mass. 1990) (holding that a court should decide whether committee is disinterested and 
whether it “reached a reasonable and principled decision”); Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 
323, 327-28 (N.C. 1987) (holding that reviewing court must determine whether action 
complained of was just and reasonable to the corporation). 
 15. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06. See also Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union 
of Am., 259 Minn. 257, 267, 107 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Minn. 1961) (stating that a “demand 
should be made on the board of directors unless the wrongdoers constitute a majority of 
the board” or it is “plain from the circumstances that [a demand] would be futile”). 
 16. See George W. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder 
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 96, 105-09 (1980) 
(arguing that the use of special litigation committees may effectively prevent derivative 
suits in most cases). 
 17. James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit 
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, DUKE L.J. 959, 963 (1982) 
(observing that nearly all special litigation committees reject proposed shareholder 
derivative litigation).  Similarly, in all cases where the Minnesota Court of Appeals has 
had occasion to review the decision of a special litigation committee, the committee has 
found that pursuing the demanded litigation is not in the corporation’s best interests. See 
Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Black v. NuAire, Inc., 
426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506-
07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
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influence of the board that appointed them as well as biases originating 
in their elite socioeconomic status that could prevent them from being 
impartial.18 
Until Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had not addressed the use of special litigation committees and the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals had done so only in three cases.19  Janssen 
extended the rule to Minnesota nonprofit corporations and, most 
importantly, defined the role of such committees by balancing corporate 
autonomy and shareholder rights.20  To further that balance, the court 
adopted a bright-line rule requiring trial courts to allow derivative actions 
to proceed if the decision of the special litigation committee is found 
wanting.21  This “one strike and you’re out” standard undermines the 
traditional business judgment rule in Minnesota and the broader concern 
of the court by “balancing” corporate self-governance and derivative 
claims.22  The rule may set the stage for further limitations on the use of 
special litigation committees by Minnesota corporations.23 
This article will first consider the origin and development of the 
business judgment rule in Minnesota.24  Next, this article will offer an 
analysis of Janssen, discussing the reasoning of the decision and the 
implications that it has for Minnesota nonprofit corporations.25  Finally, 
this article will describe how Janssen may signal a retrenching of the 
traditional deference Minnesota courts have shown to corporate boards 
and consider the possible future of the business judgment rule in 
Minnesota.26 
 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS GOVERNING 
SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES IN MINNESOTA 
The business judgment rule was applied to corporate decisions 
regarding whether or not to participate in litigation as early as 1917.27  
 
 18. See Strougo v. Bassini, 112 F.Supp.2d 355, 362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing 
biases inherent in special litigation committee system). 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part III.C. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See infra Parts III&IV. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 
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However, the use of special litigation committees as a tool to mute 
allegations of board bias first became common in the 1970s.28  Special 
litigation committees did not make an appearance in Minnesota 
jurisprudence until Minnesota Statutes section 302A.243 was enacted in 
1981.29  At the time, there was substantial debate among both 
commentators and courts about whether such committees should be 
permitted and, if so, what level of deference their decisions should be 
accorded.30  For example, many courts have questioned the allegedly 
 
(1917). 
 28. Richard C. Brown, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Special Litigation 
Committee, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 601, 616 (1982). 
 29. The statute provided: 
Unless prohibited by the articles or bylaws, the board may establish a 
committee composed of two or more disinterested directors or other 
disinterested persons to determine whether it is in the best interests of the 
corporation to pursue a particular legal right or remedy of the corporation 
and whether to cause the dismissal or discontinuance of a particular 
proceeding that seeks to assert a right or remedy on behalf of the corporation.  
For purposes of this section, a director or other person is “disinterested” if 
the director or other person is not the owner of more than one percent of the 
outstanding shares of, or a present or former officer, employee, or agent of, 
the corporation or of a related corporation and has not been made or 
threatened to be made a party to the proceeding in question.  The committee, 
once established, is not subject to the direction or control of, or termination 
by, the board.  A vacancy on the committee may be filled by a majority vote 
of the remaining members.  The good faith determinations of the committee 
are binding upon the corporation and its directors, officers, and shareholders.  
The committee terminates when it issues a written report of its 
determinations to the board. 
MINN. STAT. § 302A.243 (1986), repealed by Minn. Laws, ch. 172, § 11 (1989). 
 30. The principal case criticizing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979), 
was Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).  Zapata held that not only 
must a corporation prove the independence and good faith of its special litigation 
committee, there must also be a “reasonable basis” for the committee’s decision.  Id. at 
789.  Furthermore, even if such a reasonable basis exists, Zapata authorizes a court to 
exercise its own judgment regarding whether the suit should proceed.  Id.  The purpose of 
this broad power is “to provide a safeguard against the danger that the difficult-to-detect 
influence of fellow-feeling among directors (i.e., so-called ‘structural bias’) does not 
cause cessation of meritorious litigation valuable to the company.”  Biondi v. Scrushy, 
820 A.2d 1148, 1164 n.40 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
  In Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals echoes these very concerns, stating that “the possible risk of hesitancy 
on the part of the members of any committee . . . to investigate the activities of fellow 
members of the board where personal liability is at stake is an inherent, inescapable, 
given aspect of the corporation’s predicament.”  Id. at 210-11 (quoting Auerbach, 393 
N.E.2d at 1002).  But the court failed to address the concerns directly and instead adopted 
the Auerbach approach, finding that even if courts could provide a more objective 
analysis of disputed corporate decisions than a conflicted special litigation committee, 
6
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impartial committees, noting that it is “unrealistic to assume that 
members of [special litigation] committees” are not likely influenced by 
those who appoint them.31  Furthermore, the business professionals who 
typically serve on such committees may have a “there but for the grace 
of God go I” attitude toward derivative claims that prevents them from 
making impartial decisions as to whether a suit should proceed against 
their fellow corporate leaders.32  For reasons such as these, Delaware and 
courts in other states began, in the early 1980s, to allow courts to inquire 
into not only the good faith and independence of special litigation 
committees, but also the substance of their decisions.33 
It was in this legal landscape that Minnesota Statutes section 
302A.243 was first applied in Black v. NuAire.34  The Black decision 
held that the express language of section 302A.243 required the court to 
review the decisions of a special litigation committee only to determine 
if they were made in good faith, defined as “honesty in fact in the 
conduct of the act or transaction concerned.”35  The court in Black also 
stated that this standard of review was consistent with the approach 
followed by other jurisdictions with similar statutes, and cited the 
reasoning of those decisions as supporting its decision.36 
In particular, the court in Black noted two policy rationales 
discussed in Auerbach v. Bennett37 that supported its decision.  First, 
 
such oversight would “work an ouster of the board’s fundamental responsibility and 
authority for corporate management” and must therefore be rejected.  Id.  For further 
discussion of the academic and judicial debate on this subject in the early 1980s, see 
generally Cox, supra note 17 (summarizing development of the business judgment rule in 
the early 1980s), and Dent, supra note 16, at 105-09 (arguing that the use of special 
litigation committees may effectively prevent derivative suits in most cases). 
 31. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 
1983). 
 32. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—the Business Judgment Rule, 
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 641-42 (2002) (characterizing “structural bias” as “the 
predilection of directors to favor those of the same social or economic class, such as 
fellow directors or senior managers” and to sympathize with the directors of a 
corporation to such an extent that their neutrality is compromised). 
 33. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981). 
 34. 426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).  The reason for the absence of 
decisions and law on the subject is likely that, as the Minnesota Supreme Court noted, 
“shareholder-derivative litigation is not an everyday occurrence in Minnesota’s courts.” 
Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003). 
 35. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 subd. 13 (1986)). 
 36. Id. at 210 (citing Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (construing Delaware law); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 
F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980) (applying California 
law); and Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (applying New York law)). 
 37. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). 
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decisions regarding the interests of a corporation should be delegated to 
those best positioned to make them, namely the directors of the 
corporation.38  Second, it noted that the business judgment rule promotes 
efficiency in the resolution of corporate affairs by “[precluding] 
stockholders from disrupting the board’s decision through derivative 
actions where the board has determined a particular action is not in the 
corporation’s best interest.”39  Both of these rationales boil down to a 
single principle: the decisions of a corporate board are presumed to be 
exempt from challenge unless and until it is proven that the board is 
incapable of acting in the best interests of the corporation.40  When Black 
was decided, this reasoning (known as the “Auerbach approach”) was a 
subject of vigorous debate.41  The Black decision considered, but 
declined to adopt, alternatives to the Auerbach approach because of its 
“interpretation of section 302A.242 to preclude judicial interference 
beyond inquiry into the interest and good faith conduct of an appointed 
committee.”42 
In 1989, Minnesota Statutes section 302A.243 was repealed.43  It 
was replaced with Minnesota Statutes section 302A.241 subdivision 1, 
which specifically empowered Minnesota business corporations to 
appoint “special litigation committees,” but was silent as to the level of 
deference that must be accorded to such committees.44  The legislative 
record contains some evidence that the repeal of section 302A.243 was 
not intended as a comment on the substance of the section or the decision 
 
 38. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 211 (citing Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. See also Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 882 (“The business judgment rule is a 
presumption protecting conduct by directors that can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose.”) (citing DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS § 18 (5th ed. 1998)). 
 41. See supra note 17. 
 42. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 210 n.3. 
 43. Minn. Laws, ch. 172, § 11 (1989). 
 44. In relevant part, Minnesota Statutes section 302A.241 subdivision 1 states: 
A resolution approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the board may 
establish committees having the authority of the board in the management of 
the business of the corporation only to the extent provided in the resolution.  
Committees may include a special litigation committee consisting of one or 
more independent directors or other independent persons to consider the 
legal rights or remedies of the corporation and whether those rights and 
remedies should be pursued.  Committees other than special litigation 
committees . . . are subject at all times to the direction and control of the 
board. 
MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 subd. 1 (2001) 
8
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in Black,45 but was instead an attempt to give the courts “flexibility” to 
“develop” the business judgment rule.46  These statements at least imply 
that the legislature envisioned that Minnesota courts would someday 
deviate from the rule in Auerbach.  There could be no other logical 
reason to offer courts “flexibility” with the intent to “allow the case law 
to develop,”47 particularly when the Black court believed its application 
of the Auerbach approach was mandated by section 302A.243.48  At the 
very least, it appears evident that the legislature intended the courts to 
substantively consider alternatives to Auerbach in light of the ongoing 
scholarly and judicial discussion of special litigation committees.49 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, interpreted the 
comments of Senator Luther otherwise.50  When the court of appeals 
next considered the application of the business judgment rule to special 
litigation committees in Skoglund v. Brady,51 it specifically held that the 
decision in Black “was not affected by the repeal” of Minnesota Statutes 
section 302A.243 and that Black therefore continued to control how the 
decisions of special litigation committees should be evaluated.52  
Skoglund cited the comments of Senator Luther53 as if they expressly 
endorsed the holding of Black.54  As noted above, this holding is at least 
somewhat inconsistent with the express language of the Black decision 
itself and the comments of the senator.55  Skoglund also explained the 
 
 45. See Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
Senator Luther’s statement at the hearing before the Senate Commission on the Judiciary 
on April 11, 1989).  In repealing MINN. STAT. § 302.243, the legislature also stated: 
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of Minnesota Statutes, chapter 645, 
the repeal of Minnesota Statutes, section 302A.243, does not imply that the 
legislature has accepted or rejected the substance of the repealed section but 
must be interpreted in the same manner as if section 302A.243 had not be 
[sic] enacted. 
Minn. Laws, ch. 172, § 12 (1989). 
 46. See Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 506 (citing Senator Luther’s statements at the 
senate hearings that the repeal of section 302A.243 was intended to give the courts 
“flexibility” to allow the case law of the business judgment rule to develop). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 210. 
 49. See Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 506. 
 50. See supra note 45. 
 51. 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 52. Id. at 21. 
 53. See supra note 45. 
 54. Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 21. 
 55. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 209-10 (“We interpret section 302A.243 to preclude our 
courts from reviewing the merits of a recommendation to dismiss a shareholder’s 
derivative action when that recommendation is made by a disinterested committee 
9
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policy arguments made in Black when describing the general function of 
the business judgment rule, but failed to evaluate them in light of 
possible alternatives or state that they were the basis for its decision.56  
The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to review the Skoglund 
decision.57 After Skoglund, Minnesota courts applied the business 
judgment rule as a general principle of law outside the context of special 
litigation committees.58 
The next case to consider the use of special litigation committees to 
terminate derivative litigation was Drilling v. Berman.59  In Drilling, the 
court considered Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado60 and similar cases from 
North Carolina and Massachusetts that adopted and applied alternatives 
to the Auerbach approach.61  However, Drilling rejected all of these 
alternatives without any substantive analysis.62  Instead, the court stated 
that the level of deference to be accorded to special litigation committees 
“is not a question of first impression.” 63  While technically true, the 
reality is that in the decade before Drilling, no Minnesota court had ever 
taken up the nearly express direction of the Minnesota legislature to 
“develop” the law of special litigation committees.  The court in 
Skoglund had wrongly claimed, mistakenly or for rhetorical purposes, 
that it was bound by Black.64 The Drilling court followed along by 
holding that Skoglund and Black were controlling precedent.65 
The inquiry into the “good faith” and “independence” of a special 
litigation committee, as authorized by these cases, is a very limited and 
deferential process.  It can be described by the Drilling court as follows: 
[T]he corporation may be expected to show that the areas and 
 
conducting its investigation in good faith.”). 
 56. See Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 20-21. 
 57. See Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), review 
denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 1996). 
 58. Minnesota also applied the business judgment rule as a general principle of 
common law in St. James Capital Corp, v. Pallet Recycling Assoc. of N. Am., Inc., 589 
N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) and Wigart v. Cervenka, 1999 WL 243231 *3 
n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (unpublished).  However, neither of these cases involved the 
appointment of a special litigation committee. 
 59. 589 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 60. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
 61. Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Zapata 
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981), Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59 
(Mass. 1990) and Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 65. See Drilling, 589 N.W.2d 509. 
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subjects to be examined are reasonably complete and that there 
has been a good-faith pursuit of inquiry into such areas and 
subjects.  What has been uncovered and the relative weight 
accorded in evaluating and balancing the several factors and 
considerations are beyond the scope of judicial concern.66 
Under this deferential review, the only proper inquiry is “[w]hether 
a committee’s investigative methods demonstrate good faith.”67  
Furthermore, “[r]ather than focusing on one element of the committee’s 
investigation, the proper inquiry is into the adequacy of the committee’s 
procedures and methodologies as a whole.”68  Factors recognized as 
relevant to this inquiry include: 
(1) the length and scope of the investigation, (2) the 
committee’s use of independent counsel or experts, (3) the 
corporation’s or the defendants’ involvement, if any, in the 
investigation, and (4) the adequacy and reliability of the 
information supplied to the committee.69 
Under this approach, even a short report that fails to address pertinent 
issues is deserving of judicial deference, provided that it describes a 
methodology that is “reasonably complete,”70 regardless of how 
outlandish or seemingly unreasonable the conclusions reached by the 
committee might be.71 
III. JANSSEN: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Facts 
In Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, certain members of the Minneapolis 
Police Relief Association72 (the “MPRA”), including lead plaintiff 
 
 66. Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 508 (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 
(N.Y. 1979)) (emphasis in original). 
 67. Id. at 509 (citing Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1003) (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 509 (citing Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 70. Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 507-08 (stating but not agreeing with appellants’ 
contention that the “brevity of the committee’s report indicates a lack of good faith 
because it does not . . . address all of the claims raised in appellants’ complaint”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. The MPRA is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation charged with administering a 
pension fund maintained for approximately 1000 Minneapolis police officers hired before 
June 15, 1980, and their spouses and beneficiaries.  MINN. STAT. § 423B.04 (2003).  The 
MPRA is incorporated and operates under MINN. STAT. 317A, the Minnesota Nonprofit 
Corporation Act, and is governed by a nine member Board of Directors, which is elected 
by its members.  MINN. STAT. § 423B.05 subd. 1 (2003). 
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George Janssen, brought a derivative suit on behalf of the MPRA against 
two of its partners, Brian Rice and Charles Berquist (collectively “Best”), 
alleging attorney malpractice.73  Plaintiffs alleged that Best had 
committed malpractice in its alleged review of certain ill-fated 
investments the MPRA made through an investment adviser named 
David Welliver (“Welliver”).74  In 1996 and 1997, the MPRA lost 
approximately $15 million in one such investment, a company known as 
“Technimar.”75  The MPRA Board engaged two separate law firms to 
conduct investigations into this loss and to prosecute several related 
lawsuits.76  However, the MPRA Board of Directors (the “Board”) 
specifically declined to initiate legal action against Best, who remained 
its general counsel.77  Plaintiffs brought this action and several others78 
only after failed attempts to assume control of the Board and to convince 
the Board to support their claims against Best.  Plaintiffs alleged that 
Best served as general counsel for the MPRA and failed to conduct a 
“due diligence” inquiry into the Technimar investment.79  The lawsuit 
alleged that the Board was biased and could not make an impartial 
decision as to whether Best should be sued.80 
In response to the lawsuit, the Board appointed attorney Robert A. 
Murnane (“Murnane”) to investigate Plaintiff’s claims and determine 
whether it was in the best interests of the MPRA to join in Plaintiff’s 
claim.81  The Board instructed Murnane to conduct an independent 
review of this issue but not to “reinvestigate” facts discovered by the two 
law firms previously hired by the Board in connection with the Welliver 
investments.82  Murnane, however, was free to deviate from the 
conclusions of those reports.83   
After several months of reviewing voluminous documentary 
evidence and records from other legal proceedings, Murnane concluded 
that pursuing legal action against Best would “not be a prudent use of the 
MPRA funds.”84  Murnane did not interview Plaintiffs or their counsel.85  
 
 73. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2003). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., Stocke v. Berryman, 632 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 79. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 879-80. 
 80. Id. at 880. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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The Board then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ derivative suit on the 
grounds that the court should defer to the judgment of the MPRA, as 
exercised by its special litigation committee.86  The district court held 
that the business judgment rule, as applied through special litigation 
committees, applies to Minnesota nonprofit corporations.87  However, 
the court found that Murnane’s first investigation was impermissibly 
limited insofar as the Board had instructed him not to reinvestigate facts 
described by prior investigations.88  Additionally, the court could not 
determine whether Murnane had offered a business judgment or legal 
opinion, and was concerned that Murnane did not interview Plaintiffs 
and their counsel.89 
Instead of ruling on the Board’s motion to dismiss, the district court 
deferred its decision and gave the Board an opportunity to remedy the 
deficiencies in Murnane’s original report by instructing Murnane to 
conduct an additional investigation and to submit “adequate evidence of 
independence and good faith.”90  The Board subsequently instructed 
Murnane to conduct such additional investigation as he deemed was 
appropriate and clearly indicated that Murnane was not limited in any 
way with respect to the information he could consider or the 
investigation he could conduct.91  Murnane then duly conducted such an 
expanded investigation, which included additional review of various 
documents as well as interviews with several plaintiffs and their 
counsel.92  At the end of the investigation, Murnane again provided the 
Board with a report that concluded that pursuing the plaintiffs’ claims 
against Best was not in the business interests of the MPRA.93 
Based on Murnane’s second report, the Board renewed its motion to 
dismiss, which was converted into a motion for summary judgment by 
the district court and granted.94  The district court specifically found that 
Murnane’s investigation was conducted independently and in good 
faith.95 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 881 (internal quotations omitted). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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B.  Janssen in the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
decision, finding that Minnesota nonprofit corporations lack the statutory 
authority necessary to appoint a special litigation committee.96  
Specifically, the court held that under the Minnesota Nonprofit 
Corporations Act, the Board could only establish committees “subject at 
all times to the direction and control of the board.” 97  The Business 
Corporation Act, on the other hand, also contains such language but 
specifically exempts special litigation committees from board control.98  
The court reasoned that the differences between these two sections 
indicated that the legislature did not intend to allow nonprofit 
corporations to appoint any independent committees and that the 
inability to appoint such an independent committee was an absolute 
barrier to the appointment of any special litigation committee by such a 
corporation.99 
More importantly, the court of appeals also found that Murnane’s 
investigation failed to satisfy the demands of the business judgment 
rule.100  Specifically, the court found that the district court, having ruled 
that Murnane’s first investigation was not conducted with independence 
and good faith, could not later defer to a decision by that same 
committee.101 
C.  Janssen in the Minnesota Supreme Court 
The Minnesota Supreme Court partially reversed the court of 
appeals, holding that the general authority granted by the Minnesota 
Nonprofit Corporations Act permits nonprofit corporations to appoint a 
special litigation committee whose decisions are entitled to deference 
under the business judgment rule.102  Specifically, the court held that the 
modern Nonprofit Act and the Business Act were revised many years 
apart and that a review of the pertinent legislative history relating to each 
act “produced no discernible indication of why” special litigation 
 
 96. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 645 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d, 
662 N.W.2d 876, 881 (Minn. 2003). 
 97. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 317A.241 subd. 1 (2000)). 
 98. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 subd. 1 (2000)). 
 99. Id. at 498-99. 
 100. Id. at 499-500. 
 101. Id. at 500. 
 102. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 884-85 (Minn. 2003). 
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committee language was omitted from the Nonprofit Act.103  In the 
absence of legislative history, the court considered the consequences of 
adopting the court of appeals’ interpretation of section 317A.241.104  The 
two consequences discussed by the court were reminiscent, but 
significantly different from, the policy rationales of Auerbach: the ouster 
of nonprofit directors from corporate governance and the desirability, 
from a corporate board’s point of view, of being able to “weed out 
nuisance suits.”105  The court concluded, after applying these Auerbach-
like policy rationales, nonprofit and for-profit corporations were 
identically positioned and that, accordingly, both should be afforded the 
ability to appoint special litigation committees.106 
The Minnesota Supreme Court argued that the court of appeals’ 
statutory argument was misguided because, while “statutes govern 
certain aspects of corporate life . . . corporate litigation has largely been a 
creature of common law” that courts can properly address even in the 
absence of express statutory authority.107  Alternatively, the court argued 
that the power to appoint a special litigation committee was one aspect of 
the broad “incidental” powers of a corporation to govern its affairs.108  
The court concluded that the business judgment rule, as applied through 
special litigation committees, applies to Minnesota nonprofit 
corporations.109  However, the court went on to note that it was not 
adopting “a particular version of the business judgment rule for use with 
Minnesota nonprofit organizations.” 110 
After this lengthy analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed 
the court of appeals’ decision that the district court could not defer to 
Murnane’s second report, holding that whenever a district court 
 
 103. Id. at 886. 
 104. Id. at 886-87. 
 105. Id. at 887. 
 106. Id. at 887-88. 
 107. Id. at 887. 
 108. Id. (“The old concept of a corporation as a bundle of only a few, specifically 
granted powers, has been replaced by the concept of a corporation as an artificial person, 
lacking only those powers which the law specifically denies to it.”) (citing HOWARD L. 
OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS § 168 (6th ed. 
1994). 
 109. Id. at 888. 
 110. Id. at 888 n.5 (noting that a more “exacting” level of judicial scrutiny might be 
called for in the case of nonprofit corporations because the risk of losses cannot be spread 
to other investments and because investments may be less mobile than in the case of a 
business corporation).  The potential ramifications of these remarks, which arguably draw 
an untenable distinction between business and nonprofit corporations, for special 
litigation committees in Minnesota are discussed below. 
15
Moutz: Janssen v. Best & Flanagan: At Long Last, the Beginning of the En
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
5 MOUTZ - PAGINATED.DOC 12/8/2003  2:51 PM 
504 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
 
concludes that a special litigation committee report does not satisfy the 
business judgment rule, any pending derivative suit must proceed 
immediately.111  According to the court, a board of directors that is faced 
with derivative litigation has “one opportunity to exercise its business 
judgment” through a special litigation committee.112  The majority 
argued this absolute rule “strike[s] a balance” between corporate 
autonomy and the “nullification” of shareholder rights that would occur 
if the courts allow corporate boards to “continually improve” their 
investigations to meet the demands of the business judgment rule.113  
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that a more lenient rule would 
allow corrupt corporate boards to collude with their special litigation 
committees to obtain judicial sanction for their decision to bar a 
derivative action.114 
Justice Hanson, joined by Chief Justice Blatz, concurred with the 
majority’s decision regarding the application of the business judgment 
rule to nonprofit corporations, but dissented as to its holding that 
Murnane’s second investigation could not be considered by the district 
court.115  Justice Hanson argued that there was “no authority” supporting 
the majority’s “one strike you’re out” rule and that the need for 
supplemental court-ordered investigations by a special litigation 
committee should simply be viewed as additional facts that may be 
relevant to evaluating the committee’s good faith and independence.116 
IV. THE JANSSEN BALANCING ACT AND ONE-STRIKE RULE—
STUMBLING TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM 
OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN MINNESOTA? 
The Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Janssen purports to be 
based on an attempt to “balance” allowing corporations to “control their 
own destiny” and the desirability of “permitting meritorious suits by 
shareholders and members” to proceed.117  Interpreted broadly, Janssen 
points toward an abandonment of the Auerbach approach in Minnesota 
and may, in the end, accomplish what the legislature’s repeal of 
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.243 did not—give the Minnesota Court 
 
 111. Id. at 888-89. 
 112. Id. at 890. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 888. 
 115. Id. at 890 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 890-91 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 890. 
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of Appeals an opportunity to develop a new paradigm for evaluating the 
decisions of special litigation committees. 
The Janssen decision cites two principal rationales for allowing 
nonprofit corporations to appoint special litigation committees.  First, a 
“properly functioning board of directors” is better equipped than the 
courts to make judgments concerning the “merits of a lawsuit” brought 
by a shareholder or member.118  Second, nonprofit corporations “would 
benefit from the ability to weed out nuisance suits.”119  These principles 
are reminiscent of the reasoning articulated in Auerbach, but seem to 
place a greater emphasis on the desirability of allowing corporations to 
eliminate meritless derivative litigation as opposed to absolute board 
control over corporate affairs.120  Prior to Janssen, Minnesota decisions 
expressly regarded the protection of corporate autonomy as a principal 
goal of special litigation committees.121  For example, the Black court 
described one of the purposes of the business judgment rule as 
“preclud[ing] stockholders from disrupting the board’s decision through 
derivative actions where the board has determined a particular action is 
not in the corporation’s best interests.”122  Despite the arguably different 
emphasis of the Janssen decision, it is clear that Janssen did not wholly 
abandon Auerbach’s autonomy rationale.  The Janssen decision opposes 
allowing the judiciary to review “the merits of every lawsuit brought by a 
member of a nonprofit corporation” on the grounds of limited judicial 
resources,123 corporate autonomy, and a lack of judicial expertise in 
business affairs.124  However, these concerns are tempered by a 
substantial criticism of the special litigation committee that is implicit in 
the Janssen decision’s bright line rule giving corporate boards “one 
opportunity” to appoint such a committee.125 
This aspect of the decision imposes a limit on the otherwise broad 
 
 118. Id. at 886 (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. at 887 (emphasis added). 
 120. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979). 
 121. See Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Drilling v. 
Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 122. Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979)); see also Skoglund, 541 
N.W.2d at 20 (citing Black, 426 N.W.2d at 209-10). 
 123. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 886.  It is odd that the Janssen court would cite this 
rationale after itself noting that “shareholder-derivative litigation is not an everyday 
occurrence in Minnesota’s courts.”  Id. at 882.  Presumably, any administrative burden 
associated with judicial involvement in such suits would be minimal, at least in 
Minnesota. 
 124. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 882. 
 125. See id. at 890 (citing Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508 (Del. Ch. 1984)). 
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power of trial courts to manage litigation.126  Specifically, it prevents a 
trial court that has found a lack of independence from permitting a 
corporate board to cure this deficiency through a second investigation.127  
This bright-line rule is inconsistent with the purposes of the business 
judgment rule as it has been traditionally articulated by both the Eighth 
Circuit and Minnesota state courts, and is not directly supported by any 
decisions in other jurisdictions.128  Until Janssen, Minnesota courts 
viewed board autonomy as an essential aspect of corporate existence that 
must be protected against shareholder or member interference except 
where the members of a board or their appointees are afflicted by 
partiality or self-interest.129  Carrying this reasoning through to its logical 
conclusion supports the argument that courts should have the discretion 
to permit additional investigations by a special litigation committee for 
purposes of curing errors in its original mandate provided that the 
committee proceeded independently and in good faith.130   
The majority rejected this approach, because “[i]f the courts allow 
corporate boards to continually improve their investigation to bolster 
 
 126. For example, a trial court is normally permitted to accept a renewed motion for 
summary judgment at any time. See id. at 891 (Hanson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 127. Id.  The court did suggest that a district court could defer its decision to dismiss 
a derivative claim pending the submission of additional evidence concerning a 
committee’s methodology.  Id. at 889 n.6. 
 128. The majority does cite several cases in support of this proposition.  Id. at 889-
90.  However, all of these cases stand only for the proposition that a derivative suit 
should proceed when summary judgment has been denied and do not reach the issue 
decided by the majority in Janssen—that a trial court lacks the discretionary authority to 
allow a board to order its special litigation committee to supplement a deficient report. 
See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 380 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 (N.Y. 1979); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 
53 (Mass. 1990); Will v. Engebretson & Co., Inc., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873-74 (Ct. App. 
1989); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 972 (Del. Ch. 1985); Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 
Misc.2d 853, 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
 129. See Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 130. Such a process would not be appropriate in every case and could even raise 
additional questions about the integrity of the committee.  As Justice Hanson stated: 
There may be situations where an initial investigation by a special litigation 
committee is so tainted that an expanded investigation, at least by the same 
committee, could not cure the deficiencies in the required independence and 
good faith.  For example, if there was evidence that [a special litigation 
committee] had developed some bias or was committed to reach the same 
recommendation no matter what facts or arguments were brought to [its] 
attention, the [revised] second report would stand no better than the first. 
Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 891 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
  These concerns, however, could appropriately be addressed by the district court 
in the course of evaluating the good faith and independence of the committee. 
18
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their business decision, the rights of shareholders and members will be 
effectively nullified.”131  While this argument is susceptible to several 
interpretations, the most reasonable are: (1) any additional investigations 
ordered by a district court will be guided by the will of the board toward 
the inevitable conclusion that proposed litigation should be denied,132 
and (2) a board that has once failed to appoint a special litigation 
committee to act independently and in good faith should not be trusted to 
utilize the special litigation committee mechanism.133  However, in either 
event, the Janssen decision expresses a fundamental distrust of the 
special litigation committee mechanism and assumes that courts are 
incapable of exercising their discretion to prevent manipulation of that 
system.134 
In a final attack on the Auerbach approach, the Janssen decision 
specifically noted in dicta that concerns particular to nonprofit 
corporations may justify application of “a more exacting standard of 
judicial review” to nonprofit corporations than is applied to business 
 
 131. Id. at 890. 
 132. This remark is reminiscent of a broader criticism of the special litigation 
committee mechanism: that such committees are appointed only because the directors 
know they will provide a desirable decision. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, Baldwin v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (“If . . . the directors expected 
any result other than a recommendation of termination . . . they would probably never 
establish the committee.”) 
 133. This interpretation, if correct, does not account for the categorical prohibition 
on supplemental investigations, which the Janssen decision adopted.  It is entirely 
possible that a board may be mistaken as to the scope of the investigation that should be 
conducted or otherwise make some entirely innocent mistake that, under Janssen, would 
doom their corporation to derivative litigation.  Presumably, a “continually improving” 
series of investigations implicitly or expressly guided by the courts would better serve the 
legitimate interests of shareholders or members than a derivative suit that is permitted to 
proceed only because of a technical error by the corporation’s board.  It is more likely, 
therefore, that the Janssen decision was concerned about a structural problem in the way 
special litigation committees operate rather than the effect of a failure to correctly appoint 
a special litigation committee. 
 134. The mere expression of these concerns may not determine what approach the 
Minnesota Supreme Court adopts.  Nearly all courts have recognized that the decisions of 
special litigation committees may be infected by structural bias but many have 
nevertheless found that “independent directors are capable of rendering an unbiased 
opinion despite being appointed by directors and sharing a common experience with the 
defendants.” Strougo v. Bassini, 112 F.Supp.2d 355, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Peller 
v. The Southern Co., 707 F.Supp. 525, 527 (N.D.Ga. 1988), aff’d, 911 F.2d 1532 (11th 
Cir. 1990)).  However, at the same time, these are the same kind of criticisms that have 
led other courts to abandon the Auerbach approach.  See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Mass. 
1990); and Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987). 
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corporations.135  Courts that have applied the business judgment rule to 
nonprofit corporations have not entertained such an approach,136 though 
some commentators have endorsed it.137  More importantly, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s concern for shareholders who cannot freely 
move their money out of a nonprofit corporation might equally well be 
applied to many business corporations, potentially including in some 
cases closely held corporations138 or even publicly traded corporations 
with alienation restrictions on employee-owned stock.  These 
 
 135. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 2003).  This 
statement is arguably at odds with Janssen’s earlier discussion of the business judgment 
rule and its application to nonprofit corporations. Id. at 883 (concluding that the same 
needs which drive application of the business judgment rule to business corporations 
including corporate autonomy, limits on judicial ability to review business decisions, and 
the need to discourage overly risky adverse behavior apply in the case of nonprofit 
corporations as well and concluding “that the boards of nonprofit corporations may 
receive the protection of the business judgment rule”).  Id. 
 136. See Finley v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 2000) 
(applying business judgment rule to decision of special committee appointed by 
homeowners association); Miller v. Bargaheiser, 591 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1990) 
(applying business judgment rule to decision of special committee appointed by hospital); 
see also Fairhope Single Tax Assoc. v. Rezner, 527 So. 2d 1232, 1235-36 (Fla. 1987) 
(equating members in a nonprofit association with stockholders in a corporation, the 
court applied the business judgment rule to the nonprofit organization and declined to 
substantively review the decisions of its governing body); Tiffany Plaza Condo. Assoc. 
Inc., v. Spencer, 416 So. 2d 823, 826-27 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (while not specifically 
mentioning the business judgment rule, the court effectively applied it by deferring to the 
judgment of the corporation in determining whether a particular real estate improvement 
was necessary or beneficial to the association); Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Employees’ 
Ret. Sys., 952 P.2d 1215 (Haw. 1998) (applying business judgment rule in context of 
public pension plan); Papalexiou v. Tower West Condo., 401 A.2d 280, 286 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. 1979) (applying the business judgment rule to preclude legal action on the merits of a 
decision made by the board of directors of a nonprofit corporation); Dockside Ass’n, Inc., 
v. Detyens, 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that the business judgment 
rule applies especially well to nonprofit corporations); Burke v. The Tennessee Walking 
Horse Breeders & Exhibitors Assoc., 1997 WL 277999, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (court 
applied the business judgment rule in deferring to the decisions of the board of a 
nonprofit corporation). 
 137. See Mary Francis Budig et al., Pledges to Nonprofit Organizations: Are They 
Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced? 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 100 (1992) (arguing that 
nonprofit corporations are exempt from many market and internal forces that promote 
responsibility to shareholders); see also Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment 
Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit Directors? 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 956 (2003) 
(arguing that the threat of litigation is essential to ensure nonprofit directors since other 
methods of controlling directors are not available in the nonprofit context and endorsing 
an ordinary negligence standard of conduct for nonprofit directors). 
 138. A similar argument was made and rejected in Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 
203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), based upon the express language of former MINN. STAT. § 
302A.243.  Id. at 211. 
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possibilities are all the more real given the absence of viable precedent 
on this point and Janssen’s silence on the issue of what standard of 
review should be applied to those special litigation committees appointed 
by business corporations.139 
While Janssen may represent a realization that special litigation 
committees are a potentially flawed mechanism, the court’s reaction to 
this epiphany leaves much to be desired.  The Janssen “one strike” rule 
inflexibly gives plaintiffs’ attorneys an opportunity to benefit from good-
faith mistakes by a board while failing to prevent directors from 
appointing committees that formally follow an appropriate methodology 
but whose conclusions are nevertheless substantively biased.140  In other 
words, this rule combines the worst elements of the Auerbach approach 
with an increased probability that meritless derivative suits will be 
permitted to proceed against corporations.  However, Janssen is not 
entirely without merit.  The one-strike rule may allow courts to catch an 
unethical board in the act of controlling its special litigation committee 
or encourage boards to exercise greater caution to ensure that special 
litigation committees are independent and act in good faith. 
It would have been more consistent with the concerns expressed by 
the court, as well as with the policy rationales of Auerbach, to adopt a 
more flexible approach to special litigation committees—such as giving 
corporate boards accused of partiality the option of appealing to the trial 
courts to select, appoint, and monitor a special litigation committee for 
them.141  In order to defer any burden this approach might have on the 
 
 139. The Janssen decision specifically refrained from addressing these issues in the 
context of either nonprofit or corporate in general.  See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 n.5 
(“We do not adopt a particular version of the business judgment rule for use with 
Minnesota nonprofit corporations today.”); see also id. at 886-88 (discussing numerous 
“principles” that guide the decision but refraining from any explicit endorsement of a 
particular approach to special litigation committees).  Furthermore, as argued supra Part 
II, controlling precedent on this point (Skoglund, Drilling, and Black) is arguably no 
longer relevant (in the case of Black) or is based on a misinterpretation of precedent and 
legislative history (Skoglund and Drilling).  In short, the way is open for the Minnesota 
courts to adopt a less-deferential version of the business judgment rule. 
 140. See discussion of the deferential approach Minnesota courts have taken when 
reviewing the decisions of special litigation committees, supra Part II.  Since courts have 
limited their analysis to whether a committee’s methodology was proper, a committee 
could shelter improper motives and substantively biased conclusions through a formally 
neutral and complete methodology. 
 141. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 709 (Iowa 1983) 
(holding that directors charged with misconduct may not participate in the selection of 
special litigation committee members and that, where the majority of a board is accused 
of bias, the corporation may apply to the court for judicial appointment of a special 
litigation committee). 
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judicial system, corporations could be required to pay a modest 
administrative fee for this service.  This solution would have the 
advantage of reducing the numerous problems occasioned by allowing 
directors accused of misconduct to select those who will determine their 
fate and could, if the courts exercise good judgment, also reduce the 
impact of the structural bias that concerned Zapata and its progeny. 
Another difficulty with Janssen is that the decision fails to fully 
address the concerns the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed about 
the potential for abuse of the special litigation committee.  Janssen’s 
decreased emphasis on corporate autonomy and concern that special 
litigation committees may become vehicles to prohibit legitimate 
shareholder claims suggest that the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
implicitly endorsed a more substantive paradigm for evaluating the 
decisions of such committees.142  This “balancing” of the need to permit 
legitimate shareholder suits while respecting corporate autonomy is more 
reminiscent of Zapata than Auerbach. 
The essence of Zapata is a two-step standard of review requiring 
courts to first consider the independence and good faith of a 
committee,143 and second to  “determine, applying its own business 
judgment” whether the derivative suit should be dismissed.144  The 
second step does not necessarily involve a detailed factual inquiry.145  
Furthermore, the second step is discretionary and is employed only 
where a court senses that the procedural requirements of the business 
judgment rule have concealed substantive bias or that the shareholder’s 
action is deserving of further review prior to termination in order to 
ensure that the corporation’s interests are protected.146  This review has 
been compared to an “imprecise smell test allowing the court to search 
between the lines of the SLC’s report of [sic] the scent of a meritorious 
claim enclosed within a record that has not been opened by truly 
adversarial proceedings.”147 
 
 142. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 890 (expressing the concern that shareholder’s 
rights would be nullified if a corporate board is allowed to use investigation to bolster 
their business decision). 
 143. See Strougo v. Bassini, 112 F.Supp.2d 355, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (summarizing 
Zapata approach). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (stating that 
the court’s review requires only a “balancing of probabilities as to the likely future 
benefit” of the suit to the corporation, not a detailed analysis of the proposed suit’s 
merits). 
 146. Id. at 789. 
 147. Strougo, 112 F.Supp.2d at 368 (quoting Johnson v. Hui, 811 F.Supp. 479, 490 
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In some sense, Janssen has implicitly endorsed a limited and 
inflexible version of this approach by finding that the failure to appoint 
an independent committee is suspicious enough to taint all further efforts 
by a board to redeploy the committee, even if subsequent investigations 
are procedurally flawless.  The Janssen court appears to have “looked 
between the lines” and found that such a situation likely indicates 
misconduct.  It would be wholly consistent with Janssen for a court to 
apply this same methodology and “balancing test” in other circumstances 
where the facts suggest a meritorious suit is being suppressed. 
There are several good reasons for the Minnesota courts to do so.  
First, as discussed in this article, Skoglund, Drilling, and Black are not 
based on firm authority, and the reasoning of Janssen seems to authorize 
a rejection of the Auerbach approach.  Furthermore, a majority of 
jurisdictions have recognized the fundamental problems inherent in the 
special litigation committee system, as explained above, and found that 
these problems necessitate substantive judicial intervention.148  Adopting 
the approach of one of these jurisdictions, such as the Zapata approach, 
would give the Minnesota courts an extensive amount of experience and 
precedent to draw upon.  Janssen has opened the door for the Minnesota 
courts to take up the task given to it by the legislature when Minnesota 
Statutes section 302A.243 was repealed.  All that remains is for an 
enterprising trial court or appellate court to walk through it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Until Janssen, the Minnesota Court of Appeals had mistakenly held 
that it was bound to follow the Auerbach approach for over a decade.  
Janssen did not directly address the propriety of these decisions, but it 
did present a framework that, if followed in subsequent decisions, would 
seem to suggest that a less-deferential approach to special litigation 
committee decisions is now the law of Minnesota.  The precise contours 
of this new approach have yet to be defined by the courts, but the 
fundamental logic of Janssen and strong public policy concerns suggest 
that a version of the Zapata or Miller approaches may be appropriate. 
 
 
(N.D. Cal. 1991)). 
 148. See id. at 362 (stating “[s]tructural bias in special litigation committees has been 
widely discussed and analyzed” and noting that the standards of review developed by 
courts are “designed to overcome the effects, if any, of structural bias”) (citing Weiland 
v. Illinois Power Co., 1990 WL 267364, at *15 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1990)). 
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